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Introduction
The Arab Spring, the wave of protests that has swept the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since December 
2010, has come to epitomize the cross-national diffusion of 
regime contention (Solingen, 2012). Scholars and journal-
ists quickly adopted the domino metaphor to describe the 
successive onset of revolts in the MENA region. There is a 
consensus that the successful protests in Tunisia and then 
Egypt set in motion a process of regime change by sending 
a powerful signal to protesters in other countries, who were 
inspired by what their Tunisian and Egyptian peers achieved 
(Hale, 2013; Herb, 2014; Lynch, 2013; Saideman, 2012). 
That is, the diffusion of regime contention in the Arab 
Spring seems to have been driven by “demonstration 
effects” (Hale, 2013; Lynch et al., 2014; Patel et al., 2014; 
Saideman, 2012) or, in other words, learning (Weyland, 
2012). In this respect, the Arab Spring is similar to other 
revolutionary waves (Hale, 2013; Patel et al., 2014; 
Weyland, 2009, 2010).
Our contribution provides a quantitative test of the argu-
ment that learning explains the cross-national diffusion of 
protests in the Arab Spring, focusing on the mobilization 
phase of the uprisings (Lynch, 2014a: 3). The argument 
has been made many times using anecdotal or qualitative 
evidence. The nature of the phenomenon, however, also 
requires quantitative analysis: as Hale (2013: 334) warns, 
“the very sense of drama that makes the idea of regime 
change cascades compelling can put scholars at risk of 
overemphasizing superficially prominent causes”. A quan-
titative analysis helps to provide a colder examination of 
the argument. We also develop hypotheses on “demonstra-
tion effects” that allow us to examine the specific nature of 
the learning process, and in particular to assess whether it is 
rational or bounded. Weyland (2012) argues that protesters 
relied on cognitive shortcuts such as availability and repre-
sentativeness, which led them to extrapolate the experience 
of successful protests and overestimate the likelihood of 
similar outcomes in their local context. If that is the case, 
successful protests should have been imitated quickly, 
based on a superficial assessment of their outcomes, and 
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2 Research and Politics 
without careful consideration of whether they can be repli-
cated in a different context. These hypotheses are consist-
ent with qualitative evidence (Lynch, 2013, 2014a; 
Weyland, 2012), but they have not been subjected to quan-
titative tests.
This article offers one of the few statistical analyses of 
the Arab Spring and the first quantitative analysis of dem-
onstration effects in this context. Lynch et al. (2014) use 
Twitter data to show how Syrian protests were at first 
directly inspired by prominent counterparts in the region, 
not just by their neighbors, but how the protests later lost 
this focus. Brancati (2014) includes the Arab Spring in a 
broader sample of protests and focuses on their economic 
determinants instead of diffusion. Danneman and Ritter 
(2014) study the diffusion of preemptive repression as a 
reaction to conflict in neighboring countries, but their anal-
ysis does not include the Arab Spring. Finally, Hussain and 
Howard (2013) use fuzzy-set-QCA to examine the role of 
mobile phone use in the protests without an explicit diffu-
sion angle.
Our statistical analysis, relying on a dyadic analysis of 
20 MENA countries between December 2010 and April 
2011, finds that successful protests, those that led to a 
regime change defined as the replacement of a dictator 
(Brownlee et al., 2013: 36), were more likely to be imitated 
in other countries, but especially within the first couple of 
weeks, well before a meaningful assessment of their out-
comes was possible. Moreover, the imitation of protests did 
not depend on geographic proximity, nor on the compara-
bility of political and social structures. These findings con-
firm that protests diffused and that protesters learned from 
the experience of their peers in other countries, but also that 
the lessons they drew were biased by cognitive shortcuts.
Rational and bounded learning during the Arab 
Spring
Prevailing explanations for the onset of protests argue that 
economic and political grievances lead people start chal-
lenging their political regime (Brancati, 2014). Scholars of 
the Arab Spring have emphasized such explanations. 
Dalacoura (2012: 66), for example, argues that an “explo-
sive mix of socio-economic problems and widespread and 
deepening political grievances constituted a common 
causal thread behind all the uprisings”. Prior to 2011, the 
MENA countries were afflicted by many problems that laid 
the ground for protests, such as high unemployment among 
educated youth, rampant corruption, social inequalities, 
deteriorating economic conditions, and increases in food 
prices. Several studies emphasized that economic grievances 
are particularly dangerous when a large part of the popula-
tion are young adults (Hvistendahl, 2011; LaGraffe, 2012; 
Nordås and Davenport, 2013). A so-called “youth bulge” 
was a common characteristic in the affected countries, as 
the proportion of young adults (15–29 years old) was, for 
example, 38% in Tunisia and Bahrain, 43% in Egypt, and 
53% in Yemen (Hvistendahl, 2011: 552). Finally, Brownlee 
et al. (2013, 2015) emphasize the absence of oil wealth and 
of hereditary succession not for the emergence of uprisings, 
but for regime change conditional on protests. These eco-
nomic and demographic factors explain where protests 
might arise, but not their timing. Weyland (2012: 919) 
argues convincingly that economic and demographic deter-
minants are “necessary conditions for widespread conten-
tion”, but they do not explain why protests unfolded at this 
particular time (Dalacoura, 2012). Brownlee et al. (2015: 
42) “find no structural preconditions for the emergence of 
uprisings” (original emphasis).
To explain the emergence of protests in the Arab Spring, 
we focus on learning arguments that have been developed 
in the recent diffusion literature (Gilardi, 2012; Simmons 
et al., 2006)1 and that are often referred to as “demonstra-
tion effects” in research on the Arab Spring (Hale, 2013; 
Saideman, 2012). Thus, we shift the focus from which 
characteristics make protests more likely in a given country 
(Brancati, 2014) to how prominent events in the region 
shaped their spread. To explain the diffusion of regime con-
tention, (Weyland, 2009, 2012) identifies two mechanisms: 
rational and bounded learning. Both assume that protesters 
observe events in other countries and use them to update 
their evaluation of the costs and benefits of protesting in 
their own country; in particular, the prospects for success 
(Lynch, 2014a: 8). The key difference is that rational learn-
ing assumes full rationality, while bounded learning implies 
reliance on cognitive shortcuts that can lead to inaccurate 
assessments.
Rational learning assumes that actors maximize their 
utility in a fully rational way and take uncertainty and 
imperfect information into account accurately. Decisions 
are a function of systematic and unbiased cost–benefit cal-
culations. In the case of regime contention, protesters are 
expected to challenge their government if they conclude 
that the costs of the status quo exceed the risks of protesting 
(Buenrostro et al., 2007; Weyland, 2009). One way to 
assess the risks of protesting is the past behavior of the 
regime, and another is the nature and number of uprisings 
in other countries. Protests elsewhere reveal how strong the 
ruling regimes and discontent within societies are, and how 
violently the ruling regimes react. This information signals 
the mobilization potential and odds of success in the local 
context, which, if positive in the view of the protesters, can 
trigger “spiraling contestation” (Weyland, 2009: 399). In 
short, the rational framework suggests that protesters 
update their belief about the costs of contention and the 
chances of success using new information from other coun-
tries. Buenrostro et al. (2007: 354) argue that the probabil-
ity of being successful is “one of the key factors influencing 
potential protesters’ decision to take action” (see also 
Koopmans, 2004). Successful regime contentions in other 
countries show that regimes are vulnerable. However, 
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contentions against repressive regimes are risky, given that 
the chances of success are meager and the costs of failure 
significant. Therefore, according to the rational learning 
argument, protesters evaluate thoroughly whether their 
opportunity structure is comparable to that in the country in 
which they observe successful protests. This framework 
suggests that protesters assess information systematically 
using a process similar to a Bayesian updating, and that 
foreign examples are more valuable to protestors when they 
believe these foreign examples’ political, institutional, and 
socio-economic conditions are similar to conditions in their 
own country. In this Bayesian updating framework, the 
quantity and quality of available evidence are taken into 
account carefully (Meseguer, 2009).
By contrast, bounded learning emphasizes the tendency 
of protesters to act based on cognitive shortcuts. People do 
not process information fully rationally. Instead, they are 
influenced by information that strikes their attention 
because of its vividness. They rely on two heuristics: avail-
ability and representativeness (Kahneman et al., 2002; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1981). The availability heu-
ristic determines which information people pay attention 
to. In our context, it implies that potential protesters are 
influenced by dramatic and remarkable events, to which 
they attribute disproportionate weight. The representative-
ness heuristic affects how information is processed. 
Protesters can be expected to make distorted inferences by 
overestimating the relevance of the focal event to their own 
situation.
Weyland (2009, 2010, 2012) relies on this theory to 
study the diffusion of regime contention, including in the 
Arab Spring. He argues that a dramatic event leading to a 
successful regime overthrow can quickly trigger a wave of 
regime contentions. Potential protesters believe that their 
chances of success are similar to those of successful front-
runner countries. After a successful protest, they infer that 
their regime is also weak, that internal discontent is also 
sufficiently widespread, and that the regime’s security 
forces will also behave as they did in the protesting nation. 
These inferences are made regardless of differences in the 
political regimes or the demographic structure between the 
two countries. Potential protesters are inspired by dramatic 
events and believe that they are representative of their own 
situation. However, often their focus on “logically irrele-
vant similarities and patterns of correspondence” (Weyland, 
2010: 1153) will lead them to the wrong conclusions. 
Weyland (2012) finds evidence of bounded learning in the 
case of the Arab Spring. In line with the availability heuris-
tics, the stunning events in Tunisia and Egypt attracted 
enormous attention and were emulated by protesters in 
other countries. Protesters acted based on rumors and nar-
ratives, not balanced information, and believed that the 
Tunisian and Egyptian events were representative for their 
own country, even in contexts radically different such 
as the Gulf monarchies (Lynch, 2013: 83, 104). These 
cognitive biases were driven by hope: protesters wanted to 
imitate the accomplishments in Tunisia and Egypt by using 
“the same watchwords, slogans, and symbols” (Weyland, 
2012: 926). The “day of rage”, for example, a phrase coined 
by Egyptian protest movements, was subsequently taken up 
by protesters in other MENA countries. The signals coming 
from other countries were not analyzed carefully. Instead, 
“[t]he comparison to Egypt and Tunisia exaggerated the 
real prospects for victory” in the eyes of “hopeful but naive 
protestors” (Lynch, 2013: 103). As Lynch (2013: 99) writes 
vividly, “in those delirious moments, their victory [. . .] 
seemed unstoppable”.
Several qualitative studies provide empirical evidence 
for the relevance of bounded learning in the Arab Spring 
(Cooley and Nexon, 2011; Dalacoura, 2012; Herb, 2014; 
Heydemann and Leenders, 2011; Lutterbeck, 2012; Lynch, 
2013; Weyland, 2012). However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there has been no quantitative analysis of demonstra-
tion effects or learning during the Arab Spring.
We rely on two factors for distinguishing between 
bounded and rational learning: the speed of diffusion and 
the relevance of political and socio-economic similarities. 
First, the bounded learning framework suggests that poten-
tial protesters imitate successful protests quickly, without 
waiting to observe their ultimate outcome. The speed of 
mobilization was a distinctive characteristic of the upris-
ings (Lynch, 2014a: 4). Accordingly, the first hypothesis is:
H1: Successful protests are emulated quickly.
Second, we consider whether similarities and differences 
between countries matter. The rational learning framework 
suggests that protesters take factors such as differences in 
regime type (Herb, 2014) and socio-demographic structures 
into account, pondering whether the situation in the trigger-
ing country is comparable to their own situation. By con-
trast, the representativeness heuristic of bounded learning 
suggests that protesters believe that the stunning events are 
representative despite fundamental differences in regime 
types, population structures, country sizes, and the involve-
ment of extra-regional powers (Anderson, 2011; Fjelde, 
2010; Goldstone, 2011; Heydemann and Leenders, 2011; 
Lutterbeck, 2012; Lynch, 2013; Weyland, 2012). 
Accordingly, our second hypothesis is:
H2: Successful protests are emulated regardless of polit-
ical or socio-demographic differences.
Data and methods
We study the spread of protests across the 20 countries of 
the MENA region from December 2010 to April 2011 and 
show in the appendix robust results for a smaller sample of 
17 countries.2 Because the protests unfolded quickly 
(within 14 weeks), we use weeks as time units. We define 
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protests as episodic, public, and collective events that 
involve people directing social, economic, or political 
claims at a government (Rasler, 1996: 137). To code where 
and when protests occurred, we use “hard” information on 
the protests’ place, time, and form of action (Koopmans and 
Rucht, 2002: 238) collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP).3 Table 1 lists the dates of protests in the 
MENA region and indicates whether they led to a regime 
change, defined as the replacement of a dictator (Brownlee 
et al., 2013: 36).4
To test the hypotheses, we rely on the directed dyadic 
approach: a standard method in diffusion research 
(Boehmke, 2009; Gilardi, 2010; Gilardi and Fuglister, 
2008; Volden, 2006). Units of analysis are dyads, or pairs of 
countries, whereby the first country (i) is the potential 
receiver of protests and the second country (j) is the poten-
tial sender. The dependent variable is coded 1 if protests 
take place in the first country after they have already taken 
place in the second country, and 0 otherwise. To test the 
temporal hypothesis, we construct five variations of this 
variable using different time frames, between 1 and 5 
weeks, and we compare the analysis of the different time 
frames. The shorter the time frame, the faster are protests 
emulated. This dependent variable does not code imitation 
directly. It is possible that the sequence of protests is not 
due to cross-national influences. Thus, this type of depend-
ent variable is often labeled “potential imitation”. The point 
of the analysis is to see whether potential imitation was 
consistent with the hypothesized diffusion process. The 
advantage of the dyadic approach is that it allows to exam-
ine the influence of specific examples, which is at the core 
of the idea of learning or demonstration effects. Based on 
their formal model of policy learning, Volden et al. (2008: 
327–328) note that “scholarship providing evidence of a 
greater likelihood of policy adoption given earlier effec-
tiveness elsewhere would lend convincing support to the 
concept of learning-based policy diffusion”. Considering 
the outcomes of protests instead of their mere occurrence is 
crucial, and the dyadic setup offers an effective way to 
include this piece of information in the statistical model.
We focus on three main explanatory variables, namely, 
the success of protests in the sender, political and socio-
economic differences between sender and receiver, and 
political and socio-economic characteristics of the receiver.
Success of protests in sender country (j). We code a pro-
test as successful if it was followed by a regime change, 
defined as the replacement of a dictator (Brownlee et al., 
2013: 36). As we did for the dependent variable, we con-
struct five versions of this variable by extending the time 
frame from 1–5 weeks. This setup allows us to gauge 
whether successful examples in the sender country increase 
the probability of potential imitation in the receiver coun-
try, comparing shorter and longer time frames. We expect 
the coefficient of these variables to be positive but decreas-
ing as the time span increases. As alternative and broader 
definitions of success, we report robust findings when we 
include cases with large-scale mobilization and sustained 
protests, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya (see Table 4 of the 
online appendix), and when we use data from Hussain and 
Howard (2013), which assign high success values to 
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya (see Table 5 of the online 
appendix).
Differences between receiver country (i) and sender 
country (j). We code the absolute and the directed differ-
ences between the political regimes of the sender and 
receiver countries using their Polity IV scores and two 
alternative measures. The Polity IV index ranks countries 
on a 21-point scale from autocracies to fully institutional-
ized democracies. The absolute differences gauges whether 
“potential imitation” is more likely the more similar the 
regimes are; while the directed differences tests whether 
protests in autocracies are perceived as strong signals of 
non-repression. The larger the Polity IV score of the 
receiver country compared with the sender (Polity IVi  –
Polity IVj), the larger the resulting signal that protests will 
not be repressed. The Polity IV has been widely used but 
also criticized (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005). As a first alter-
native, we rely on the State Fragility Index, a five point-
scale indicator of state repression “closely associated with 
() (a state’s) systemic resilience in [. . .] responding effec-
tively to challenges and crises” (Marshall and Cole, 2011: 
7). As a second alternative, we construct a dummy variable 
using a regime typology based on the data from Hadenius 
and Teorell (2007), which distinguishes between democ-
racy, multi-party autocracy, military regime, monarchy, and 
others (Fjelde, 2010).5 The robust findings of the alterna-
tive regime type measures are reported in Tables 7 and 8 of 
the online appendix. Following our second hypotheses, 
Table 1. List of MENA countries with protests during the 
Arab Spring. Success indicates that the protest lead to a regime 
change. See the online appendix for analyses using alternative 
specifications of the sample and success.
Country Date of protest Success
Tunisia 19 December 2010 Yes
Algeria 7 January 2011 No
Jordan 15 January 2011 No
Egypt 17 January 2011 Yes
Oman 17 January 2011 No
Yemen 23 January 2011 No
Lebanon 25 January 2011 No
Saudi Arabia 28 January 2011 No
Sudan 30 January 2011 No
Bahrain 14 February 2011 No
Iran 14 February 2011 No
Libya 16 February 2011 No
Morocco 20 February 2011 No
Iraq 25 February 2011 No
Syria 18 March 2011 No
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these absolute and directed differences should be irrelevant 
to the diffusion of protests. Thus, we expect the coefficients 
of these variables to be indistinguishable from zero. As 
additional measures of similarity, we consider absolute dif-
ferences in population size, share of urban population, and 
ethnic and religious compositions. Again, our second 
hypothesis states that these differences do not matter for 
protest diffusion. Data for population size and share of the 
urban population come from the Correlates of War project 
(Singer et al., 1972), while the data on the religious and 
ethnic compositions are taken from the fractionalization 
dataset (Alesina et al., 2003).
Domestic characteristics of the receiver country (i). 
Finally, we include data on the socio-economic characteris-
tics of the receiver country. First, we include GDP per cap-
ita to account for economic conditions. We expect a 
negative relationship between this variable and the imita-
tion of protests. Second, we include the proportion of young 
adults (15–19 years old) to see whether a “youth bulge” 
increases the probability of imitation. Third, we include a 
democracy dummy using data from Hadenius and Teorell 
(2007). We expect that imitation is more likely in democra-
cies. Finally, we control for oil and gas rents (as a percent-
age of GDP). More descriptive information on the data is 
available in Table 3 of the online appendix.
There are three methodological issues in directed dyadic 
analyses (Boehmke, 2009; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008). 
First, for many of the country dyads the dependent variable 
must be 0 due to how the variable is constructed. This is the 
case when neither country in a dyad experienced protests 
during the investigated time period, or when protests 
already occurred in both countries. As suggested by 
Boehmke (2009), we exclude these dyads from the analy-
sis, which decreases the number of dyads from 5320 to 
1046. Second, to control for time dependence, we include 
time, time squared, and time cubed (Carter and Signorino, 
2010). Third, the data structure induces complex dependen-
cies among observations that need to be taken into account. 
We compute classic standard errors but the results are 
robust to adjusting standard errors for clustering on dyads 
or on country  i (see Table 10 of the online appendix).
Findings
Table 2 shows the estimates of five models. The main vari-
able of interest is “success in country j,” which we expect 
to be positively correlated with the probability that country 
i imitates the protests that occurred in country j. To investi-
gate how this relationship changes over time, we consider 
protests that occurred in the past week (Model 1), in the 
past 2 weeks (Model 2), in the past 3 weeks (Model 3), in 
the past 4 weeks (Model 4), and in the past 5 weeks (Model 
5). In each model, the dependent variable is recoded accord-
ingly. Following H1, we expect that the effect of successful 
examples diminishes over time. Thus, estimates of “success 
in j” should decrease in size and significance from Model 1 
to Model 5.
The results support the hypothesis that successful pro-
tests are emulated rather quickly. The positive effects of 
successful protests in country j  on “potential imitation” in 
country i are large and statistically significant in Model 1 
and Model 2, which consider events in the past one and 
two weeks, while they decrease with the longer time frame 
in Models 3–5. Figure 1 plots the effects of successful 
uprisings in country j on the likelihood that the protests are 
imitated by country i in different time frames. In the first 
week, the odds of protest imitation are ten times larger if 
the protests were successful than if they were not. Then, 
the effect decreases. After 4 weeks, it remains positive but 
is significantly smaller. Overall, the pattern is consistent 
with the argument that protests spread quickly by bounded 
learning.
These findings suggest that protesters rushed into pro-
testing after they observed that an uprising against the 
regime made it more vulnerable and could lead to its over-
throw. This is consistent with qualitative evidence showing 
that the successful protests in Tunisia and Egypt galvanized 
and inspired protesters in other MENA countries (Dalacoura, 
2012; Heydemann and Leenders, 2011; Lutterbeck, 2012; 
Weyland, 2012). The decreasing influence of successful 
examples provides empirical evidence that the dynamics in 
the Arab Spring are quite accurately explained by the heu-
ristics of availability and representativeness.
The results for the relational variables lend further sup-
port to the plausibility of the representativeness heuristics 
(H2). Overall, political and demographic similarities 
between country i and country j do not influence the prob-
ability of imitation. Protesters are not more likely to imitate 
uprisings in countries ruled by political regimes similar to 
their own, of similar size, or with comparable ethnic and 
religious populations (maybe with the exception of similar-
ity in urban compositions, although the findings for that 
variable are not consistent across all models). Not even 
geographic proximity seems to matter: protesters were not 
more likely to imitate events that occurred in neighboring 
countries. This finding is consistent with Lynch et al. 
(2014), which shows that social media discussions of the 
Syrian conflict referenced Egypt and Tunisia rather than 
Syria’s neighbors, and with the argument that the emer-
gence of a new Arab public sphere played a key role in 
creating a shared narrative across the region (Lynch, 2013, 
2014b).
Finally, the findings for domestic characteristics of coun-
try i are largely in line with previous analyses: the larger the 
youth bulge and the worse the economic conditions (meas-
ured as GDP per capita), the more likely a country is to imi-
tate protests. Particularly, the youth bulge has been identified 
in the literature as an important predictor for the likelihood 
of political protests (Hvistendahl, 2011; LaGraffe, 2012; 
Nordås and Davenport, 2013). However, the democracy 
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dummy and oil and gas rents are not systematic predictors 
of imitation. While some domestic characteristics are 
important variables for gauging the risk potential for pro-
test imitation, they cannot explain the timing of such events. 
This finding is consistent with the argument that while 
structural factors are of great importance to explain the out-
comes of protests, they do not matter for their emergence 
(Brownlee et al., 2013, 2015). Instead, the strong, immedi-
ate demonstration effect of successful regime changes 
prompted protesters to “[jump] to the conclusion that they 
could successfully challenge their own autocrats” (Weyland, 
2012: 927).
The additional analyses reported in the online appendix 
show that these findings are robust across many alternative 
specifications of the statistical models, including broader 
definitions of success, different samples, other regime type 
measures, additional control variables, and adjusting stand-
ard errors for clustering on dyads.
Table 2. Logit estimates predicting “potential imitation,” with standard errors in parentheses. Intercept and t, t2, and t3 are 
included, but not shown.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Success in country j  
 Past week 2.375***  
 (0.634)  
 Past 2 weeks 1.957***  
 (0.462)  
 Past 3 weeks 1.388***  
 (0.418)  
 Past 4 weeks 0.824**  
 (0.401)  
 Past 5 weeks 0.795**
 (0.362)
Relational variables (ij)  
 Neighbors 0.580 0.601 0.519 0.295 0.098
 (0.631) (0.439) (0.374) (0.356) (0.340)
 Polity IV∆ij −0.090 −0.005 0.013 0.005 −0.038
 (0.078) (0.050) (0.041) (0.039) (0.037)
 Polity IVi – Polity IVj 0.003 0.022 −0.015 −0.001 −0.005
 (0.057) (0.039) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
 Population ∆ij 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.016 0.013
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
 Urban population ∆ij 0.029 0.018 0.017 0.025
** 0.021**
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
 Religion ∆ij 1.742 0.455 0.625 0.617 0.650
 (1.239) (0.853) (0.716) (0.659) (0.617)
 Ethnicity ∆ij −0.637 −0.997 −0.771 −0.263 −0.343
 (1.351) (1.031) (0.873) (0.806) (0.758)
Characteristics of country i  
 Youth bulge 0.141* 0.128** 0.085* 0.067 0.021
 (0.078) (0.056) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046)
 GDP per capita −0.476 −0.432** −0.561*** −0.678*** −0.825***
 (0.305) (0.218) (0.192) (0.189) (0.187)
 Democracy dummy −0.579 −0.187 −0.089 −0.308 −0.271
 (0.793) (0.589) (0.516) (0.483) (0.446)
 Oil and gas rents −0.014 −0.009 −0.003 −0.000 0.013
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Akaike information criterion 192.260 307.881 396.293 451.153 503.194
Bayesian information criterion 271.504 387.125 475.537 530.397 582.438
Log likelihood –80.130 –137.941 –182.146 –209.577 –235.597
Number of observations 1046 1046 1046 1046 1046
*** < 0.01p , ** < 0.05p , * < 0.1p
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Conclusion
We have provided quantitative evidence that a learning 
process drove the wave of uprisings in the Arab Spring. 
This was a learning process in which successful protests 
in Tunisia and Egypt spurred similar actions in other 
countries before the outcomes of the protests were clear, 
and regardless of differences in political and social condi-
tions. If they were successful, protests were about 10 
times more likely to be imitated a week after they occurred 
than if they were not successful, 7 times more likely after 
2 weeks, 4 times more likely after 3 weeks, and twice as 
likely after then. The quickly diminishing demonstration 
effect of successful protests fits well with arguments 
about the role of cognitive shortcuts, such as availability 
and representativeness, in the diffusion of regime conten-
tion in the Arab Spring (Weyland, 2012) and beyond 
(Weyland, 2009, 2010).
This article is one of the few statistical analyses of the 
Arab Spring and the first quantitative analysis of demon-
stration effects in this context. While qualitative studies 
have documented how the mechanism of bounded learning 
unfolded in various countries with detailed case-specific 
information about the protests, this quantitative investiga-
tion confirms that the general diffusion dynamic in the 
Arab Spring followed the pattern suggested by the bounded 
learning framework. In that sense, this study complements 
the qualitative findings in the literature and hopefully pro-
vides a fruitful starting point for further systematic quanti-
tative analyses of bounded learning.
This study also contributes to explaining why the democ-
ratization trajectory of MENA countries has been much less 
steady than initially hoped. After the governments of Tunisia 
and Egypt were overthrown, no other protest in the MENA 
region led to a regime change. Libya was the only notable 
exception: Muammar Gaddafi was killed on 20 October 
2011, after the UN Security Council declared a no-fly zone 
and NATO enforced it, which helped the dissidents of the 
National Transition Council in their fight against the regime. 
Four years after the Arab Spring, violence and protests are 
ongoing in many countries of the regions. Protesters were 
inspired in January and February of 2011 by a few striking 
events to attempt enduring political change, and they started 
an unstable transition process as a result.
We have focused on the role of bounded learning in the 
diffusion of regime contention. However, not only protest-
ers, but also authoritarian rulers can take cues from events 
in other countries to engage in “diffusion-proofing” 
(Danneman and Ritter, 2014; Heydemann and Leenders, 
2011, 2014; Koesel and Bunce, 2013; Lynch, 2013; 
Weyland, 2010). The interaction between protesters and 
political authorities, the “dissent–repression nexus”, is of 
great importance to the processes we have examined here, 
as well (Davenport and Moore, 2012). Moreover, our anal-
ysis could not account for the role of political elites in the 
diffusion of contention itself (Hale, 2013; Mekouar, 2014). 
Clearly, these aspects are crucial for understanding why 
many reform attempts failed. While they are outside of the 
scope of this project, they remain important questions for 
future research.
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Figure 1. Estimates of the increase in predicted probability with 95% confidence interval if prior protests in country j were 
successful compared with no success. Shown are the results for Models 1–5 based on the estimates reported in Table 2.
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In conclusion, during the Arab Spring successful pro-
tests diffused quickly regardless of differences in social or 
political conditions, consistent with theories of bounded 
learning. Unfortunately, four years later, the hopes of pro-
testers clearly appear exaggerated, which further validates 
the bounded learning perspective.
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Notes
1 As is conventional in the literature, we focus on the analysis 
of the diffusion process without explaining the occurrence of 
the first event (that is, in this study, the protests in Tunisia).
2 The main models include: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, 
the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. As robustness check, 
we exclude Iran, Israel, and Turkey from the sample (see 
Table 6 in the online appendix).
3 We double-checked the data with reporting from The 
Guardian.
4 Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates 
are the countries of our sample without protests
5 For this variable, we construct a dummy variable, coding 1 
if the countries i and j are in the same regime category (and 
0 otherwise). The only exception are the two dyads with Iran 
and Libya, which both fall into the categories “others”. As 
both regimes are quite distinct, we code these dyads as 0.
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